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I Introduction 
One of the phenomena cha阻cterizingtoday’s world is the develop-
ment of various types of international org阻 izations.Many scholars of 
mternational law have shown strong mterest in吐出 phenomenonand 
have analyzed it from different angles. 
There are a number of reasons why the general social phenomenon of 
the development of international organ包ationshas drawn世田 special
attent10n of international law scholars, and has become an object of 
legal叩 alysis.
First of al, there lies the血ctthat international organ包ationsare 
created by treaties which form an加port四 tsource of law m interna ・ 
tional law山 Asthe study of international law includes in its important 
pa凶 thestudy and analysis of various types of treaties, it is natural that 
international organizations established by treaties become a pomt of 
interest for international law scholars. 
Secondly lies the fact出atmternational organizat10ns are not natural-
ly formed units like most States but are bodies created by explicit agree-
ment among S胞tes'." A legal analysis is not necessary for the study of 
gradually evolving and naturally created units such as States which have 
some degree of political, economic, social or cultural solidarity as a 
unitmg bond. On the other hand, for entities such as internat10nal 
organizations which have been formed artificially and deliberately, based 
upon a legal document known as a treaty，加 relativelyrecent past, legal 
analysIS cannot be passed upon in understanding its orgamzational 
structure and activities. 
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Thirdly lies the heterogeneous or multi cultural character of the com-
p吐smgelements of international orgaruzat10ns The member States of 
international org剖1izationsoften possess heterogeneous cultural, linguis-
tic or religious backgrounds and therefore when trying to act in concert 
for the realization of a common goal the le伊ldocuments statmg也eir
agreement play an essential role, and the analysis of such materials takes 
on great importance. This holds not only for the action of member States 
but also for the action of the staff of the secretariats of international 
orgamza世ons,known as“international staff" or“mternational civil 
servants”It is mdispensable that some form of regulation by law is given 
for the maintenance of a concerted action of such internal!onal crv坦
servants for whose recruitment “［djue regard shal be paid to the import-
ance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible" 
(UN Charter: Article 101, paragraph 3). 
Fourthly hes the most fundamental reason as to why mternational 
law scholars have shown mterest in the study of international organiza・
tions, particularly their legal analysis. That is the recognition by the 
mternational law scholars that, while on the one hand the emergence and 
development of international organizations have rested on internat10nal 
law as mentioned above, on the other hand it is bringing about an irn-
portant fundamental change to the system of traditional international 
law:" 
There are two aspects to the unpact wrought to the system of tradi-
tional international law by the emergence and development of interna-
l!onal orgamzations One is the aspect that the nece田ityfor adjustment 
has arisen due to the disturbance of the system of traditional interna-
tronal law following the emergence of new actors (not poss田singsuch 
qualiti回 ofStates as sovereignty, territory and population) in interna-
tronal society traditionally composed of States only. From this point of 
VJew, such questions as the international legal capacity (or personality), 
treaty-makmg power, privileges and immunities and international respon-
sibility of international organizations have been tackled by theorists of 
international law. 
The other aspect rs the fact that the emergence and development of 
Legal Ch田・acteroflnt'l Org. 23 
mternatlonal or伊mzationshave forced vanous forms of changes to the 
concept of State sovereignty, which is the most basic concept in the 
traditional international legal order. Such questions as the binding force 
of the resolutions of international or伊nizat1onsupon their member 
States, the rela!Jonshlp of the voting system to the prmciple of sovereign 
equality of States, the problems of activities of international org阻 iza.
tions and the encroachment of State sovereignty (such as interference 
in domestic afars), and more recently出equestion of supra-nationality 
of mterna!Jonal organizations, have been studied from this point of View. 
A co賀町ionand fundamental quest10n when trying to indmdually 
take up the legal questions concerning international organizations as 
mentioned above is that of the legal relationship of these organizations 
to廿iermember States; or, to put 1t in different words, the qu田!ionof 
“what type of legal entities international organ包ationsare.”This paper 
attempts to give an answer to this fundamental ques!Jon by examinmg 
different theones which have been advanced. 
Two pomts of clarificat10n must be made before proceeding further 
Firstly, this paper deals only with intergovernmental (or public) inter・ 
national organizations, as the foregoing descrip!Jon clearly lilplies Non-
governmental organizat10ns (NGOs), international (multma!Jonal) com・ 
panies, mixed private and public international enterprises, al of which 
are at times mcluded in the broad category of mterna!Jonal organ包b
!Jons, are excluded. Also excluded are intergovernmental international 
organizations not directly established by treaties, such as the United 
Nations Industrial Development OrganiZation (UNIDO), the United 
Nations Development Program （凶DP)and the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), al of which were 
established by the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations (the UN). These organizations are excluded because, although 
they are bodi田 enjoy加Erelative autonomy vis-a-vis the UN, they are, 
strictly speakmg, subsidiary organs of the UN阻 dnot independent m・ 
ternational orgaruzations '" 
Secondly, al出oughthe aim of this paper is to make clear the legal 
character of present-day international org阻 iza!Jons,it is impossible to 
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give a detailed account of al such organizations, which are said to be 
over two hundred. Therefore, rela!ively well-known, representa!ive m-
ternational org叩 izat10nswill be referred to四dexplained as example渇
IL Confederation Theory 
Opinions vary within scholars as to what type of legal entities interna-
tional organ包at10nsare, in particular, on how to grasp the legal character 
of international org叩包ationsm relat10n to their member States 
The first and earliest theory may be called the “confederation theo・ 
ry.”This theory tロesto conceive of mternat10nal orgamzat10ns as but 
one form of composite States -the confederation of States. 
The ex町npleof this theoiy is found in Oppenheim's International 
Law, Vol.. I, edited by H. Lauterpacht (8th edition). In this book, re-
gional international orgamzations such as the Organization for European 
Econonuc Cooperation (OEEC later re-orgamzed as the Orgamzation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development OECD), the Orgamzation 
of American States (OAS) and the Council of Europe are given as mod・ 
em v町iat10nsof confederation;" 
Corbett, after a careful study of power, structure and funct10ns of 
the League of Nations, the predecessor of the UN and one of the earliest 
international orgamzat10ns, concludes that由eLeague is a confederation 
He writes 
“. the League of Nations, bemg mdisputably a permanent con-
tractual union of independent States having for its prmcipal obiect the 
prese円ationof peace and protection against aggression, and possessing 
a permanent organization for the realizat10n of these ends, 1s a con-
federation ... 
The Covenant does m fact present certain striking resemblances 
to the various trea!Jes of confederation. It contains the gua阻nteeof 
independence and security which 1s common to them al, provides 
similar machinery for the settlement of disputes, sets up a Diet, 
s!Jpulates contribut10田 toexpenditure, aims at the restrict10n of 
armaments attempted in the Americ阻 Articlesof 1778, prohibits世田
conclusion of treaties inconsistent with its terms ”＂＇ 
The line of thought trying to understand international organizations 
as confederations 1s considered to be a theore!ical succession from the 
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!Imes of the administralive unions and customs umons created in the late 
nineteenth century These associallons of States were seen as a type of 
union of States or confederation, and international organizations which 
have developed from them were also thought of as a devOloped form of 
confederat10ns '" That when the League of Nations, which was more 
institutionally advanced than administrative unions, was established there 
were some who saw it as a“superstate”山 suggeststhat 1t was commonly 
seen in the process of strengthening of associat10ns from a loose groupmg 
of States to a confederation and finally to a federation or a federal 
State. Peter Hay eloquently puts forward his argument along this油田
町 follows・
“Thus, it requires emphasis that, however useful, these distinctions 
(between ‘admmistratlve internat10nal organization’and‘govern-
mental mternational org阻 ization’－ note by the present writer) are 
only descnptive; the analytic problem for al forms of institutional co-
operal!on of states is the same: what pos1t10n does the associat10n 
or organization occupy in mternatlonal law vis-a-vis its members and 
as a function of this, vis-a-vis non-members, the international com-
mun江戸 For this reason, political associations and al international 
orgamzations may be considered together. By like token, classifica 
tions based on differentiations between entities created under mter-
national law (the typical internalional organization or confederation) 
and those which are an extension of national constitutional law (the 
federatlon) may be disregarded: their object is not田tablishmentof 
the existence of international legal personality: instead, these classtfト
cations measure and evaluate the degree of interaction between the 
organization and its members in order to reach a conclusion about the 
legal nature of the organization from the municipal law pomt of 
• ,, 191 view. 
The confederalion出問ry,although it has some ments in trying to 
see mternational organizations within the framework of the traditional 
system of international law, is subject to the following criticism based 
on the observation of the recent phenomenon of multiplication of inter-
national organizations and their orgamzational development 
(a) The majority of international organ包ationstoday, except the 
only example of the European Conimunities (EC), are not con-
sidered to be m the process of developing finally to become, nor 
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have世田 possibilityto become, a federal State, 
(b) Most internat.ional o培anizationstoday do not give, even in a 
hnuted sense, orders or direcl!ves to member States, which touch 
upon the sovereignty of the State喧，nordo they have世田po田ib1-
lity to give such orders or directives担 thenear future, and 
(c) Internat10nal organizat10ns, like the UN, are not at al seen, even 
in the limited sense, and ev叩血termsof posSJbility in the future, 
as sovereign entitles externally or mternally. 
For these reasons, international organ包at10nsare not considered any-
thing similar to States, even by the people working there, Accordingly, 
the confederation theory, which approximates international orgamza-
tions to (sovereign) federal States, is not a popul町 viewtoday. 
il Corporation Theory 
The second theory concerning the legal character of international 
organ包ationsregards them as corporations (or bodies corporate), rather 
than something sinilar to States (union or confederal!on of States, super-
States, world government, etcふ Thistheory is most powerfully ad-
vanced by Dayton Voorhees in 1926, m connect10n with the legal nature 
of the League of Nations.岨 He吋ectsto descnbe the League as a“super司
state，＇’ and proposes to describe it as a “c~rporat1on.” 
Voorhees a田町ts,first of al, that the League is not“super”because 
γ1] t can issue no commands, it can make no rules or regulations binding 
on any member without that member’s ex pre田 consent.”山
Secondly, Voorhees m剖ロtamsthat出eLea伊eis not a“State”be-
cause it“lacks most of the import叩tcharacteristics of a state，” wluch, 
he considers, are people, territory, government and sovereignty."' 
Finally, he concludes that the League is a“corporation”because “It 
has al of the. essential charactensl!cs of a corporation.”The essential 
characteristics of a corporation, as he enumerates, are (a) that“1t is an 
artificial being created by law”；（b) that it“exists‘as a body politic' 
under its own special name”；（c) that“it has the capacity of perpetual 
succession”；and ( d)that it“has白ecapacity of acting within the scope 
of its charter as a natural person”＂＇ 
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Voorhees reached the above conclusion by analyzing the provis10ns of 
the League’S Covenant and its prac!Jce. Particularly 'interesting is his 
companson of the relationship between the League and its member 
States to that between a coq)o田t10nand its stockholders. For instance, 
he sees that in the League the member States, apart from participatmg泊
the d1scuss10ns of the annual General Assembly meetings, do not directiy 
touch upon daily business which is being carned out by the Secretariat 
under the superVJsion of the Council. This, according to Voorhees, cor-
responds to the situat10n of a corporation where stockholders, apart 
from participating m the general meeting of stockholders, do not touch 
upon daily business which 1s bemg carried out by the president and his 
staff under the supemsion of the executive board. 
However, Voorhees also finds some difference between the League 
and a domestic corporation in that the League 1s an internat10nal associa-
tion of sovereign States created by an international treaty and endowed 
with aims which have public character, whereas a domestic co中orationis 
an association of people created by a contract under domestic law for 
private purposes such as profit-makmg and provision of benefit to its 
members. Thus, it is appropnate, he concludes, to distingmsh the League 
from a domestic corporat10n by calling the former an“internat10nal 
public corporation.”制
The corporation theory is advocated even today by scholars such as 
Clive Parry."' Yuiclu Takano also appears to support this theory when he 
writes that: 
“International organizations are not political or governmental bodies 
but are funct10nal bodies . . . . They resemble corporations within a 
municipal society ..”＂＇ (translation from Japanese by the present 
writer) 
The mam assumpt10ns of the corporation theory may be summanzed 
m the following three points:. 
(a) Like corporat10ns, international organizations are entities m-
dependent and separate from their composing members; 
(b) International orga四国10nsdo not stand superior to their member 
States with dominant power and authority；阻d
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(c) Interna!Ional org叩 izationsare, unlike Stat白， notsovereign 
en!I!Jes both internally and externally. 
Takano’s words cited below express出e田 pointsvery clearly: 
“International organizations are not simple gatherings of States as 
international conferences are; they po田es a p町manentand mde-
pendent existence and functions in the mternational society. Their 
exIStence and functions cannot be deduced mto those of the member 
States. . . . International organizations町民 onthe one h血 d,not 
political or governmental entities as States are. International o弔問iza-
tions are functional entities established on the bas担of,and with the 
consent of, sovereign States; they do not exist or function as State-
like bodies possessmg sovereign elements, nullifymg the sovereignty of 
their member States encroachrng upon or absorbmg its existence or 
funct10n.”叩（translationfrom Japanese by the present writer) 
The co叩orat10ntheory appears to descnbe accurately the current 
legal relationship between internat10nal organizations and the member 
States. However, 1t is not free from criticisms as follows: 
(a) Analogy c四 notbe so eastly drawn from the concept of a cor-
poration developed under municipal law to apply it to a quite 
different Situal!on of the international society, and 
(b) Some international org叩 izat10nstoday, like the EC or the UN, 
are actually empowered to apply, in a certam s1tuat10n, enforce-
ment measures to theu member States The International Civil 
Aviation Organization (!CAO) and the World Health Organiza-
ti on仰HO)have the power to set international st岨 dardsto be 
observed by廿teirmember States in order to achieve theu respec-
live purposes.'1' These pheno,mena are not totally explainable by 
the corporation theory. 
N Functional Theory 
The theory which gave theoretical foundation to the establishment 
and development of various mternat10nal orgamzations after the Second 
World War, centered around the UN and its specialized agencies, was由e
“functional也.eory，” orto use the more common terminology, the 
“functional approach to international organizations.”The theore!Jcal 
and practical impact the funct10nal theory has given, consciously or not, 
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to the process of the drafting of the UN Charter and the establishment 
and development of the UN’s specialized agencies and other international 
organ包ations,is inrmeasurably large. 
At世田阻met泊1eit 1s rrrefutable也atthe post-war study of interna-
!Iona! orga凶zationshas also been influenced, consciously or not, by the 
functional theory. Thus, Wolfgang Friedmann writes thatγtj here is, of 
course, no doubt that it is the functional approach which has triumphed 
泊 post-warinternat10nal orgarnsation, resulting m a complex pattern of 
orgam岨tionswith different objectives, constitutions and powers." '1 
The functional theory was most persuasively put forward by David 
Mitrany曲目 1943when世間 SecondWorld War was st出血血emidst of 
raging. His theory may be summarized as follows: 
does not pe町nitthe creation of the world gover町nentm the inrmediat e 
future. Thus, we must approach it gradually from the area (function) 
where cooperation among States is po凶ble,and from among血ecoun-
tries which share political, economic, geographical and historical sob・
darity. Generally speaking, in the area 血rtherfrom politics it is easier 
to achieve institut10nal cooperation. Such cooperation is also easier to 
achieve if one approaches it regionally.叫”
The functional theory differs from the confederat10n由eoryin that 
the former does not see interna!Ional org副首zationsas pohtical and com-
prehensive sovereign enti!Ies like States while廿10latter regards mterna-
tional organizat10ns as State-like entities although in a limited sense. The 
functional theory also differs世omthe corporation theory凪 thatthe 
former considers that the crea!Ion of an international org阻 ization
implies transfer, or concent田lion,of part of sovereignty of member 
States to the organization while the latter mamtains that member States 
retain sovereignty even though they jom担 mternat10nalor倶mzation.
If we try to describe the functional theory恒 afew words, it is the 
“federahsm by instalhnents”曲目 1tis a way to approach“peace by 
piecemeal”四or“peaceby pieces.＇’白
Al也oughthe functional theory differs from the confederation theory 
拙 pointedout above, both have the common perception of international 
organizations in the sense that the establisilment of阻 mternationalorga-
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nization results in the partial limitation or trans自erof出esovereignty of 
its member States. The difference between the two theories lies in the 
degree and nature of partiality of the limitation or transfer of sover-
eignty. Therefore, both theories come to the same conclus1on that the 
development and strengthening of internat10nal orgamza!Ions would担
the end result in a unified federal government, whe出町 regionallyor 
globally_ However, a closer look at them would teach us that they are 
decisively different on the following three points: 
(a) First of al, while the confederation theory takes the stand on 
fac加alconcep!Ion, the functional theory aims at the ・future 
realizat10n of its goal a global government; 
(b) Secondly, when we talk about confederations, we refer to the 
historical examples of unions of States involving such political 
matters as the right to conduct diplomatic relat10ns, right of war, 
right to加posetarifs; etc., but when functionalists talk about 
integration of States through international orga凶zations,they 
emphasize institutional cooperation m technical and soc12l fields 
which they clru皿 tobe separated from politics or games of 
power; and 
(c) Thirdly, as the confederation theory anticipates that each interna-
tional organization may develop to become a unified, federal 
State, the future of the mternational society would stil be 
pluralistic, whereas the functional theory a加sat the realization 
of one unified global government as a白talgoal, not a society of 
multiple federal States developed from mternatlonal organiza-
lions 
As was mentioned earlier, the practical and theoretical impact the 
functional theory has given to the post-war world 1s immense. However, 
this 1s not to田ythat the functional theory as the most popular theory 
concermng the legal character of international organ包ationshas been 
without criticism. The study of Ernst Haas attempting to prove the 
limitation of the validity of the functional approach through a detailed 
analysis of the orga凶zationand activities of the International Labour 
Organization (!LO) is well known. He concludes: 
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“With respect to organizational impact on the international environ-
ment, our s同dyof the !LO cannot ‘prove’any世tingabout the trans-
foロnationof the system ... Although the international environment 
undoubtedly underwent very dramatic changes血ce1919 moving 
simultaneously toward and away from integration (depending on 
which set of functions is exammed) -not even the most committed 
Functionalist wo叫dattribute these changes overwhelmingly to the 
work of the !LO.”四
James Patrick Sewell made a similar study by taking up the example 
of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development （也e
World Bむlk),which Mitrany refers to as a good 目前npleof an interna-
tional organization pro吋nghis theory. Sewell seems to throw some 
doubt at也evalidity of the functional theory, although he a也nits
certam ments in it, too曲
In more general terms, Stephen S. Goodspeed criticizes the functional 
theoηF as follows: 
“The inherent weakness in the functionalist approach担theassump-
hon that it is possible to prevent the intrusion of political influences 
mto the realm of technical and welfare activities. There凶 noclear 
dividing line . . . Until pohtical tensions subside and until funda-
mental political agreement is reached, there恒 litlepossibtl1ty that 
great.er economic and social cooperation wil take place.”四
Evan Luard shares the same criticism with Goodspeed." He further 
po凪tsout three shortcommgs of the functional theory. First is that 
despite the development of various technical and specialized interna-
tional organizations, the reality of the post-war presents a big hurdle of 
politics to the realization of the world mtegration. Second is也atdue to 
世田 creationof various international organizations an unanticipated ques・
tion of coordination of their activities has arisen for which we have 
found no effective四swer.Third is that the functional theory c阻 not
give an answer to the question of internal armed clashes which have be-
come a common type of conflicts after the Second World War.四
The cntJcisms of the functional theory cited above are of course valid. 
However, it has to be pointed out that they are mostly directed towards 
the fact白atthe world and international org阻包ationsare not in fact 
moving m也edirect10n anticipated by the functional theory. In other 
words, the criticisms are not directed towards the shortcomings of the 
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functional theory m its theoretical perceptlon of the nature of interna-
tional org出世zationsbut towards the lack of relevance between the 
reality of出epost-war world and the expected llage of the world 
foreseen by the functional theory. 
The present writer has always felt, through the studies of such mter-
national organ包ationsas the World Bank, that there exists a cert副n
limitation in the perception of internatlonal organ包ationsby the func-
tionalists. For example, the functional theory assumes that, when an 
international orga凶zationis given a strong decision-making power and an 
executive authonty, that orgamzatrnn can be considered to have acquired 
control over part of sovereignty of member States. The World Bank and 
other mternational financial institutions of a similar type, such as the 
International Development Associatrnn (IDA), the Internatrnnal Finan田
Corporation (IFC), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), do m fact possess a strong decision-
making power and an execul!ve authority~＂＇ but they do not seem to 
integrate member States by controlling part of sovereignty of member 
States. In reality, the activities of th田efmanc担1or伊nizationshave no 
direct connection with sovereignty because the principal function of such 
organizal!ons is the provision of funds, goods and services, nothing to 
do with sovereignty of their member States 
Conceptually, therefore, the World Bank and other similar financial 
organ包ationsare not the type of mternational orgamzal!ons the func-
tional theory tnes to characterize In fact, they are much similar to 
世田 typeof international orgamzations世間 corporatrnntheory tnes to 
conceive of. 
V Conclusion 
In the foregoing, we have analyzed three different ways to look at the 
legal character of mternational orgamzations Each seems to have some 
merits as well as shortcomings. What then凶出tbe the most appropri脚
theory on世tisquestrnnヲ
Our conclusion is that the present international org白1包ationsare so 
complex and diverse由ata Sllple theory to apply to al mternat1onal 
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orgamzations ts impossible. We may even田ythat any si:igle也eoryto 
try to descnbe the legal nature of al ii:iternational orgamzat10ns is liable 
for maccuracy because we can easily fmd examples to which such a 
theory cannot be applied. 
What ts wrong today is to try to treat al international organizat10ns 
as basically白e回meenttties on the ground that they are created by 
ii:iternational treaties among States The fact is that, dependmg upon the 
contents of吐ieagreement among States, which relates to numerous 
elements surroundmg the creation of each ii:iternational orgamzat10n, 
the legal character can be different, and担 factit is different. 
Some organizations, such as the EC, can perhaps be best explained in 
the manner proposed by the confederation theory叫 Organizations,such 
as the World Bank, can be most adequately described as corporations. 
The relations between the UN and its specialized ag回目白（excludingthe 
World Bank and three other financial organizations) can be appropriately 
explained in the context of the functional theory. What should be done, 
therefore, is not to try to prove one clear-cut theory to explain the legal 
character of al the eXJstmg ii:iternational or伊nizat10ns,but to・ try to 
analyze each mternational organizat10n to find out to what extent one 
specific theory is applicable and the others are not. 
Finally，泊 connectionwith our conclusion, we have to mention two 
加 portantpoi:its. One is that we should not assume that any org叩 iza-
tion can be explamed by one theory. It is rather likely血atan organi・
zation may have a mixed character wluch can only be explamed by 
different theories. For instance, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) could be described il the manner of the functional theory in its 
regulatory aspect 咽 offoreign exchange control: but it can also be ex-
plained as a corporat10n when we look at its cap1tahsl!c foundation and 
its operattonal activity of asist泊Emember States which have fallen into 
ex ch阻 gedeficit by providing international currency. 
The second point of nnportance JS that the same organization can 
ch叩 ge,over the years, througli either the explicit or加plicitconsent of 
its member States, the legal character of its structure and functtons. This 
has happened clearly in the case of the IMF or the EC. Actually, it is not 
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too much to阻ythat any internalional org田由ation1s undergomg some 
degree of such changes because international org副首zationsare living and 
trying to adjust their struct町eand functions to也echanging needs of 
member States阻 d世田worldas a whole. 
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国際機構の法的性質
（要約〉
横田 j羊ー
国際機構に関する研究は，従来，主として，国際法学者によって手が
けられできた。その理由は，第lに，国際機構が，国際条約という，国
際法学者の研究対象となっている法律文書を基礎につくられた組織体で
あるということである。第2に，国際機構の出現と発達によって，国家
主権，国際法の主体，外交関係法，条約法など，国際法の主要部分に大
幅な修正をほどこす必要が出てきたことも，その理由の一つである。
ところで，こうして国際法学者による国際機構研究が進行するにつれ
て，国際機構はいかなる性質の法律団体か，という問題が提起されるよ
うになった。
この点に関しては，現在，学者の聞に見解の一致は見られない。ある
学者は，国際機構を「国家連合」としてとらえ，別の学者は，それを「法
人」としてとらえる。さらに別の学者は，国際機構を，国家主権の一部
移譲による「機能的統合体」としてとらえる。これらの学説の妥当性は，
理論的には証明されない。なぜなら，理論上は，加盟国の合意さえ得ら
れれば，国際機構は，国家連合にも，法人にも，機能的統合体にもなり
うるからである。それゆえ，国際機構の法的性質を解明するには，帰納
的方法により，一つ一つの国際機構に具体的にあたり，それらがどのタ
イプに属する，あるいは近い，組織体であるかを，検証する必要がある。
現存の国際機構の主なものを概観してみると，あるものは国家連合に
近く（たとえば，欧州共同体），あるものは法人に近く（たとえば，世界
銀行），あるものは機能的統合体に近い（たとえば，国連）。今日存在する
すべての国際機構の法的性質を説明する単一の理論は，存在しないとい
うのが，結論である。
